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7. Why Was Monetary Pohcy SoIncp:.'
We trust that, in light of the preceding sections ofthis chaptet, the
adjective used in the heading of this one to characterizemonetary policy
during the critical period from 1929 to 1933 strikesOUt readersas it does us, as a plain description of fact. The monetarysystem collapsed,
hut it clearly need not have done so.
The actions required to prevent monetary collapse didnot call for a
level of knowledge of the operation of the banking systemor of the work-
ings of monetary forces or of economic fluctuations whichwas developed
only later and was not available to the Reserve System. Onthe contrary.
as we have pointed out earlier, pursuit of the policies outlined by the
System itself in the 192O's, or for that matter by Bagehot in 1873,would
have prevented the catastrophe. The men'ho established thFederal
Reserve System had many misconceptions about monetary theoryand
banking operations. It may well be that a policy in accordancewith their
understanding of monetary matters would not have preventedthe decline
in the stock of mone' from 1929 to the end of 1930.562 But theyunder-
For example, H. Parker Willis, who played a major role in theevolution of
the Federal Reserve Act, was regularly reported in the columns of the Corime,cis!
and Financial Chronicle in 1931 and 1932he had resigned from the editorship
of the Journal of Commerce in May 1931as inveighing againstopen market
operations and arguing that the only task of the Reserve Systemwas so discount
.hgible paper. A cabled article by Willis in a French publication (Agence Eco-
sornique et Financière) irs Jan. 1932, announcing that the Federal Restive System
had adopted inflationary poliet, created a Sensation in European financial circles.
Governor Moret of the Bank of France cabled the article to Harrison forcomment.
It read in part:
Inflation is she order of the day ...The discount rate will probably be low-
ered at the next meeting of thBoard of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. [The rate was not lowered until Feb. 26, psib1y because of
Willis' article.] The reduction of the buying rate for acceptances in theopen
market which took place on Tuesday [Jan.12) is a preparatory measure to
which the Federal Reserve Bank always has recourse in such cases. Financial
circles consider it an indication of a change in monetary policy and expect heavy
purchases of governmentsecurities, acceptances, and perhaps of other bills
... There is reason to expect that all attempts to curb inflation and hamper
credit expansion based on long term paper will meet with general oppocition.
Inflationary ideas have seriously taken hold of many minds in financial circles
-.. Wall Street. .hailsinflationas assuring an upward movement of
Securities.... The greatest danger inheres in the risks to which the Federal
Reserve Banks are exposed in connection with the various proposals for the
broadening of their discount and loan operations ....In view of these de-
velopments certain ob5ers ers remark that the gold export which cea.tcd some time
ago may easily begin again, the markets which permit the free export of gold
having everywhere become very narrow (Harrison, Miscellaneous, Vol.II,
Willis article, dated Jan. 13, 1932, quoted in full in cable, dated Jan. 13, 1932,
Bank of Francto Harrison).
Telephone calls and cable messages were exchanged by the New York Bank and
she Bank of France before the excitement over Willis' article subsided (Conver.I
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stood very well the problem raised by a panic attempt to convert deposiu
ntn currency, andY proviried ample powers in theWt tod] with
suchapanic. Thereislittle doubt thata policybased solels' on a thor.
ough perusal of the hearings preceding the enactment of the Federal
Reserve Act andamoderately informed understandingoftisens would
havecutshort the liquidity crisis before it had gone very far, perhaps
before the end of I93O.'
Contemporary economic comment was hardly distinguished by the
correctness or profundity of understanding of the economic forces at work
in the contraction,thoughof course there were notable exceptions.Many
sations, Vol. II, Jan.14,1932, dictated Jan. 20; Miscellaneous. Vol. 1, cable,
dated Jan. 15. 1932). New York City banks also received cables from their Paris
agencies inquiring about the article. On Jan. 16, lIarrison asked Senator Glass
to use his influence to stop "Will:? rather steady flow of disturbing and alamsing
artictes about the American position" (Miscellaneous, Vol. II).
Willis followed his former teacher J. Laurence Laughisis in his espousal of th
"real-bills" doctrine (see Chap. 5, footnote 7). He applied those criteria to the
operations of Federal Reserve Banks when he helped draft the Federal Reserve
Act while serving in 1912-13 as an expert on the House Banking and Currency
Subcommittee of which Carter Glass was chairman. After Glass became a Senator,
Willis continued to be closely associated with him.
See Banking and Currency Reform, Hearings before a subcommittee (Carter
Glass, Chairman) of the House Banking and Currency Committee. 62d Cong., 3d
sets., Jan. 7-Feb. 28, 1913; and 4 Bill to Provide for the EstablishmentofFederal
Reserve Banks. Hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
(R. L. Owen, Chairman), 63d Cong., 1st seas., Sept. 2-Oct. 27, 1913, 3 coIn. In
the House hearings especially, many witnesses showed clear understanding ofthe
remedy for a liqusdity crisis: cf. the testimony of Leslie M. Shaw, former Secretary
of the Treasury, pp. 99-101F. J. Wade, St. Louis banker,pp. 219-221 W. A
Nash, former chairman of the New Vork City Clearing House Association.pp.
338-339; A. J. Frame, Wisconsin banker,pp. 415-421. Frame did not favor estab-
lishing a reserve sy5tem; he urged extention of the Aldrich.VrcelandAct to stats
banks so they could "obtain extra cash in time of trouble." If thatwere done,
"we would never have a suspension of cash payments in the United Statesagain"
(p. 421). In the Senate hearingt, cf. the testimony of G. M. Reynolds. Chicago
banker, Vol.1,p. 228; and Nathaniel French, Iowa businessman, who testified,
"We can prevent a panic such as occurred in 1907... by provisions for ass
elastic note issue, the mobilization of reserves, and theiruse in time of need" (Vol. Ill, p. 2075).
Note also Clark Warburton's coniretent:
It is apparent that the Federal Reserve System couldoperate as intendedi.e.,
to provide an elastic currency without contracting memberbank reservesif
and only if the Federal Reserve Banks acquired additionalassets...to the
full extent of increased currency issues in she formof Federal Reserve notes
The necessity of keeping this principle in mindin the operations of the
Federal Reserve System is so obviousin view of itsdiscussion in the literature
preceding establishment of the Federal Reserve Systemand the provisions of she
Federal Reserve Actthat she failure of FederalReserve officials to handle she
System in conformity with it in the 1930'swarrants a charge of lack of adher.
ence to the intent of the law ('Monetary Difficulties and theStructure of the
Monetary System," Journal of Finance, Dec. 1952,p.535).
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professional economists as well as others viewed thedepression as a
desirable and necessary economic development requiredto eliminate in-
eflicteiscy and weakness, took for granted that the appropr;tecurd w
belt tiehtentng by both private indiidua!s and theCOVernrnent and
interpreted monetary changes as an incidental result ratherthan a con-
tributing cause.56°
The banking and liquidity crisis must, however, be distiri-iiishedfrom
the contraction in general. It was a much more specific phenomenon,
with far more clearly etched predecessors which had been stuijedand
classified at length. One i-night therefore have expecteda much better
understanding of the banking and liquidity crisis and of themeasures
required to resolve it satisfactorily than of the contraction in general.To
some extent, this expectation was fulfilled. For example, Congressman
A. J. Sabath of Illinois wrote to Eugene Meyer in January 1931. after
Meyer had turned down his suggestion that the proper responseto the
increase in bank failures was rela.xation of eliihility requirements in order
to encourage rediscounting:"Does the board maintain thereis no
cmergency existing at this time? To my mind if ever there was an
emergency, it is now, and this, I feel, no one can successfully deny. For
while 439 banks closed their doors in 1929, during the year 1930, 934
banks were forced to suspend business." On the floor of the House,
Sabath said, "I insist it is within the power of the Federal Reserve Board
to relieve the financial and commercial distress."165 Some academic people,
'"Sec. for example, Alvin H. Hansen, Economic Stabilizat ion in an Usthalanced
World, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1932, pp. 377-378. The repeated attempts to
curb federal expenditures and thsharp tax rise in 1932 testify to the effectivcess
of these views. Writing in 1932, A. B. Adams (Trends of Business, 1922-1932,
New York, Harper, 1932, p. 68) stated:
It would be quite undesirable to have an additional inflation of bank credit in
this country at the present time. There ti too much of the old inflation to be
gotten rid of before business can be put on a sound basis. Temporary inflation
would result only in a postponement of the inevitable deflation and readjustment
and thereby result only in prolonging the present depression.
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Hearings before the House Banking and
Cursencs- Committee, 72d Cong., tst sets., Jan. 6, i932, pp. 76, 102-104. See also
tht testimony in March 1932 of former Senator R. L. Owen of Oklahoma, a banker
and lawyer before his election to the Senate in l90', and chairman of the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee when the Federal Reserve Act was passed:
The powers of the Federal Reserve Board and of the Federal reserve banks were
abundantly great to have checked the collapse of values if they had had the
vision to employ the authority given by law.
Instead of expanding their credit when credit was being contracted and cor-
recting the dangerous evil they contracted their own credits from December,
1929, to June, 1930, about $700,000.000 and only expanded it by Federal re-
serve notes when the depositors in banks were driven by fear to ssho!esale hoard-
irg in August, 1930. Since January, 1932, they are again contracttr'4 credit.
Clearly what the authorities of the Federal Reserve System should have done
was to buy United States bonds and bills in the open market and emit Federal
ii 3
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such as Harold Reed, Irving Fisher, J. W. Angel!, and Karl 0ppex-
pressed similarviews.166
Despite these important exceptions, the literature, and particularlythe
academic literature, on the banking and liquidity crisis is almostas de-
pressing as that on the contraction in general. Most surprisingly,Some ci
those whose work haddonemosttolay the groundwork for the Federal
reserve notes to the extent necessary to stop the depression as far as it was due
to the contraction of credit and currency. They were so advised by theexperts
of the Royal Bank of Canada and by others. They should have neededno advice
forremedy so self-evident (Stabilization of Commodity Prices, Hearingsbefore the House Subcommittee on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 1stsets., part i,
p. 136).
See also testimony of D. H. Fisher, a director of the largest national farmloan association in the U.S., and of an Indiana county bankers' association (ibid,pp 289-293).
The monthly letter of the Royai Bank of Canada noted in July 1932:
.-[lJtis obvious that the attitude of the Rnserve System during1930 and
193150credit contraction was passive .....hen hoarding set in [datedOcto- ber 1930 by the letter], this further contraction of credit was only partlyoffset by the purchase of securities .-[l]t is necessary for large surplusreServes to
accumulate in order that the banks should feel that itis safe for them to Pursue
a more liberal policy with their clients. It is noteworthy that in relationto the
violence of the great depression, there has been much less ofan accumulation of surplus reserves than in previous periods.
'"See footnote 51 above; alto I-f. L. Reed, "Reserve Bank Policyand Economic
Planning," American Economic Review, Mar. 1933 Supplement,pp.114, 117
(he subsequently qualified his argument, on the ground thatqualitative con- trols nredto be supplemented by quantitativecontrols,in"The Stabiliza-
tion Doctrines of Carl Snyder," Quarterly Journalof Economics, Aug. 1935,
pp.6I8-620)Irving Fisher, Booms and Depression,New York,Adeiphi, 1932, pp. 96, 106, l2&-13'k, 148-152; andJ. H. Rogers, who wrote, "For the fai!- ure to create .a basisfor much-needed credit and price expansionthe Federal Reserve System is bymany capable students of its policy being held
directly responsible.Itis contended with much force that inperiods like the present one, these central institutions must eitheruse their great 'open-market'
powers to arrest damaging price declines,or else must face highly deserved crit-
icism" (America Weighs Her Gold, Yale UniversityPress, 1931, pp. 206-209 W.I.King, who Wrote, "Suppose.. thatin1930. when prices began to plunge downward precipitously, theproper Federal authorities had begun vicoroude




Reserve Act or who had been most intimately associated
with its formula-
tion--for example. 0. M. W. Sprague, E. W. Kemmerer,
and 1-I. Parker Wi!!is'rP least perrptive, perhaps because theyhad so strongan intellectual commitment to the view that the FederalReserve System had
once and for all solved problems of liquidity. Ofle can read
through the annual Proceedings of the American EconomicAssociation or of the
Academy of Political Science and find only anoccasional sign that the
academic world even knew about the unprecedented
banking collapse in
process, let alone that it understood the cause and the remedy.
That climate of intellectual opinion helps to explainwhy the behavior
of the Federal Reserve System from 1929 to 1933Was not checked or
reversed by vigorous and informed outside criticism.But neither the
climate of Opinion nor external financial pressuresnor lack of power ex-
plains why the Federal Reserve System acted as it did. Noneof them can
explain why an active, vigorous, self-confident policy inthe 1920's was
followed by a passive, defensive, hesitant policy from 1929to 1933, least
of all why the System failed to meet an internal drain inthe way in-
tended by its founders. Economic contraction from 1929to the fall of
1930, before the onset of the liquidity crisis, wasmore severe than it was
from 1923 to 1924 or from 1926 to 1927. Yet, in reactionto those earlier
recessions, the Reserve System raised its holdings ofgovernment securities
by over $500 million from December 1923 to September 1924and by
over $400 million from November 1926 to November 1927 (all figuresas
of the last Wednesday of the month). By contrast, its securityholdings in
September 1930 were less than $500 million above the lowestlevel at any
time in 1929 and more than four-fifths of the increase hadoccurred
before the end of 1929 in response to the stock market crash. Inthe
financially turbulent years, 1930 and 1931, the System's holdings ofgov-
ernment securities varied over a narrower range than in all but two of
the relatively tranquil years from 1922 through 1928----l925 and 1926.
The explanation for the contrast between Federal Reserve policy be-
fore 1929 and after, and hence for the inept policy after 1929, that
emerges from the account in the earlier sections of this chapter is the
shift of power within the System and the lack of understanding and
experience of the individuals to whom the power shifted. Until 1928, the
New York Bank was the prime mover in Federal Reserve policy bothat
home and abroad, and Benjamin Strong, its governor from its inception,
was the dominant figure in the Federal Reserve System. Strong repre-
sented the System hi its dealings with central banks abroad in a period
when each of the great central banks seemed to be per5onifled bya single
outstanding individualthe Bank of England by Montagu Norman, the
Bank of France by Emile Moreau, the German Reichshank by Hjalrnar
Schacht. In the early years of the System, Strong was chairman and the
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dominant figure of the Governors Conference, a eroup coinpoo.ci of the
chief executive of1cers of the twelve Reserse Banks. Later, in 1922. when
the Conference established a Governors Comti'ttee 011O)t'fl market
operations. out of which developed the Open Mrkt Investment corn.
niittee, he was named permanent chairmane
Strong began his career as a corssnserctal banker. He had been deeply
involved in the 1907 banking crisis, as secretary of the Bankers Trust
Company, something of a "bankers' batik," and as head of a conlinittee
set up by the New York financial leaders "to determine which institu-
tions could he saved and to appraise the collateral offered for loans"ss
That experience had greatly impressed him, as it did the bank jncorn.
inunitv in general, and had given him a Sti ong interest in the reforrr of
banking and currency. It had much to do with his becoming the first
governor of the New York Bank.
Stronc, more than an' other individual. had the confidence and back-
ir.g of other financial leaders inside and outside the System. the personal
force to make his own views prevail, and also the courage to actupon
them. In one of his last letters on System poi:cy, to Walter Stewarton
August 3, 1928, lie spoke of the necessity of an easy money polkvto
anticipate the approach of tile"breaking point" Stewart leared, and
corrinsented:
Here is where I fear the consequences of hesitation or differences ofopinion
within the System .. .if the System is unwilling to do it. then Ipresume
the New York Bank must do it alone, despite the tradition whichs' hssr
helped tocreate and maintain, that no extensive open-market operations
should be conducted by individual banks. Anemergency presents the pos-
sible need for emergency measures.
One of the directors of the New York Bank recalled inApril 1932. when
the System finally began large-scaleopen market purchases, that he had
once asked Strong. "why the authority for Federalreserve banks to pur-
chase Goverrnnent securities had been inserted inthe Federal Reserve
Act and that Governor Strong had replied thatit was in there to use.
Governor Strong had said further that if thispower were used in a big
way, it. would stop any panic which might confront us."°If Strong had
still been alive and head of the New YorkBank in the fail of 1930, he
See Chandler, Benjamin Strong,pp. 41-53, 69-70, 214--? 15, and Chaps "-Xl.
'Chandler. Benjamin Strong,pp. 27-28.
'Chandter, Benjamin Stiong,p. 460.
"° Harrison, Notes, Vol. II, Apr.4, 1932. The director, Clarence A. Woofley.
then asked why the open market purchases"could not ha.e been done sooner." Fir
said, "the national nervou3system has now been subject to strain for 29 months
whereas, in former periods of businessdepression, 5 or 6 months have sufficed to
clear up the worst of the wreckage.Is the Federal Reserve System responsib1e
for cutting off the dog's tail byinches?" Burgess pointedout that "the preseace
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would verlikely have recognised the oncomingliquiditycrisis for
what it was, would have been prepared by experience and
COnViction to
take strenuous and appropriate measures to head it off, aridwould have
had the standing to carry the System with him. Strong, knowthat
mofletalY measures could not be expected to produce immediate
effects,
would not have been IsUt off the expansionary course Lwa temporary per-
sistence of the decline in business activity,1Ti
Strong became inactive irs August 1928 and died in Octoberof that
year. Once he was removed from the Scene, neither the Boardnor the
other Reserve Banks, as we have seen, were prepared to accept thelead-
ership of the New York Bank."5 Chandler says in his biography,
of the Federal Reserve System tended to extend both the period of stimulation
and of depression of business activity" (ibid.).
°' See the copy of aletter, dated at Colorado Springs, Aug.26, 1923, from
Strong to Adolph Miller,inthe Goldenweiser PapersContainer 3,folder of
Open Market Commutee, 1923-52). Strong wrote in part:
The phenomena of credit somewhat resemble some of the phenomena of
tubetculosis, concerning which I can speak with sonic certainty. Anyimprudence or excess by a T. B. sufferer will not show ill resultx often for weeks or months.
Sonic unusual mental or physical effortstarts a slight inflammation which
gradually develops, causes a lesion, then later comes the temperaturepulse,
cough, etc.In our operatsons, suppose the imprudence consists inselling 50
or 101) millions of our Sectton 14 investments irs the New York market
.
(\%']e can if we are ignorant or careless pull down the credit structure ata rapid
and dangerous rate, by a sale of investments, which shortly causes pressure
to liquidate a much greaser volume of bank loans. That process is at maxiessurn.
(with rapid pulse and high tetnperature,st some indefinite period following
our tale, and we may fail to detect thcause on account of thc lag I mention.
Irving Fisher said, "Governor Strong died in 1928. I thoroughly believe that
if he had lived and his policies had beets continued, we might have had the stock
market crash in a milder form, but after the crash there would not have been the
great industrial depression" (Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Sects! Science, Philadelphia,1934, p.151). See also Carl Snyder, Capitalism
the Creator, New York, Macmillan, 1940, p. 203.
An episode in the struggle between the Board and the Banks, still earlier than
the dispute about how to deal with the 5tock market boom, occurred in the fall of
1927, when the Chicago Reserve Bank was unwilling to reduce itS discount rate in
line with the easy-money police originated by Strong and adopted by the Board.
The Board finally ordered the Chicago Bank (by a 4 to 3 vOte) to reduce its rate
an unprecedented action. The "action aroused bitter controversy both within and
without thSystem .... Most of the critics questioned the legality of the action;
all denied the wisdom of this assertion of power in the absence of an emergency."
Though Strong himself wanted a reduction in the Chicago rate, he "was quite
unhappy about the Board's action and sought to prevent, or at least to delay it"
(Chandler. Benjamin Stror.g, pp. 447-448). Presumably, he saw the preservation
of the Banks' independence and indeed dominance its the System as more important
than the specific substantive action of the moment.
Governor Crissinger's resignation may have been related to that incident. The
Board met on Sept. 9 to impose the rate without being informed by Cnssinger that
Strong had telephoned him earlier in the day asking him to delay the meeting
until Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, who had conferred with Strong in New
I !7e
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Strong's death left the System with no center of'nterprisng andacrptable lestletthip. The Federal Reter.'e Board was diac the NewYork Bank should no longer play that role. But the Boarditself could no! p!aytht role in an enterprising way. It was still weak and divideddespite the Substitoti00
of Young for Crissinger in 1927. Moreover,most of the other Reserve Banks
as well as that in New York, were reluctant to follow the
lea(lership of the Board,partlybecause oftheBoard's personnel,partlybecausetheystill thought of it as primarily a supervisory and review body.Thus It 5555easy for the System to slide into indecision and deadlock."
The Banks outside New York, seekinga larger share in the determina
tion of open market policy, obtained the diffusionof power throughthe
broadening of the membership of the Open MarketInvestment Corn.
mittee in March 1930 to include thegovernors of all the Banks Open
market operations now dependedupon a majority 01 twelve rather tlia
of five governors and the twelve 'came instructedby their directors"
rather than ready to follow the leadership of N'svYork as the hve had
been when Strong wasgovernor.
The shift in the locus of power, which almostsurely would not have
occurred when it did if Strong had lived, hadimportant and far-reaching
consequences. Harrison, Strong's successor at New York,was a lawyer
who had acted as counsel to the FederalReserve Board from 1914to 1920
before coming to the New York Bankas one of Strong's deputies. In 1929
and 1930, he operated in theawa of Strong's legacy and soughtto exer-
cise comparable leadership. As timewent on, however, lie revertedto his
natural character, that of an extremelycompetent lawyer and excellent
administrator, who wanted tosee all sides of an issue arid placedgreat
value on conciliating opposing points ofview and achieving harmony.I-Ic
was persuasive yet too reasonable to be trulysingle minded and dominant.
Nevertheless, if the composition of theOpen Market Committeehad not
been changed, his policies mighthave prevailed in June193Othotigh that change probably waspartly a reaction to New York'sindependent actions to meet the stock marketcrash. As it was, he hadneither the standing in the Systemnor the prestige outside the Systemnor
personal force to get his policy viewsaccepted in the face ofacti' e op- position or even plain inertia. Hisproposals were repeatedlyvote down by the other Bank governors. Whenthey finally art'1to a lge open
market operation in the springof 1932, theywere halfhearted and only
York, upon hireturn from a trip abroad, wouldarrive in Washin2toi, thenext day. Presumably Mellon wouldhave tried to dissuade theBoard from taking action, and in any case would have tiedthe vote (Hamnlin, Diary,Vol 14, Sept. 15, 1927, p. 38). Crissinger resigned Sept. 15.
Benjamin Strong,p. 465. Hamnlin, who resented thedominance of the New York Bank (see his Diary, Vol.19, Aug. 10, 1931,p. 126), nevertheless wrote of Strong, "He was a geniusaHamiltomi among bankers.His place will he almost impossible to fill" (Diary, Vol.16, Oct. 18, 1928,p. 60)#,_.,zqz-c..*
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too eager todiscontinue it. On January 20,1933,Harrison told Hamlin
that a majorityof the governors really favored a completereveisal of
open marketpolicy by letting government 5CCUfltI('5 runfJit4
We commented earlier on the difference in the level of understanding
and sophistication about monetary matters displayed by New York and
the other Resef'eBanks. The difference is understandable in viewof the
circumstances in whichthe several Banks operated and of theirresponsi-
bilities. New York was the active financiai Center of the Country The
securities market irs general and the government securities maiket in
particular were concentrated there. So also were international financial
transactions. New York was the only U.S. money market that was also a
world market- Despite the attempt of the Federal Reserve Act to reduce
the dominance of New York in the banking structure, the demands of
banks in the rest of the country for funds continued to he channeled
through the other Reserve Bank cities into New York, and banks in the
rest of the countrycontinued to maintain correspondent relations with
New Yoik banks, especially after the stock market boom got tinder way.
The New York Federal Reserve Bank was therefore acutely sensitive to
the state of the financial markets and to the liquidity pressure not only on
banks there hut also on their correspondent banks throughout the country.
Among Reserve Banks, the New York Bank alone was effectively national
in scope and accustomed to regard itself as shaping, not merely reacting
to. conditions in thecredit market. The other Banks were much more
parochial in both situation and outlook, more in the posktion of reacting
to financial currentsoriginating elsewhere, more concerned with their
immediate regional problems, and hence more likely to believe that the
Reserve Sstem must adjust to other forces than that it could and should
take the head. They had no background of leadership and of national
responsibility. Moreover, they tended to be jealous of New York and pre-
disposed to question what New York proposed.
The form which the shift of power took--from New York as dominant
head of a five-man committee to New York as the head of an executive
committee administering policies adopted by the twelve governorsalso
had an important effect. A committee of twelve men, each regarding
himself as an equal of all the others and each the chief administrator of
an institution established to strengthenregional independence, could
much more easily aeree on a policy of drift and inaction than on a
coordinatedpolicy involving the public assumption of responsibility
for decisive and lare-scale action.115 There is more than a little element
of truth in the jocular description of a committee as a group of people,
no one of whom knows what should be done, whojointly decide that
"Diary, Vol. 22, p. 61.
"Compare statements by Harrison in f,,tiiotcs 89 and 114 abose.
119/
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nothing can be done. And this is especially likely to be true ofa group
likethe Open Market Policy Conference, consisting of independent
persons from widely separated cities, who share none of that co 1lmei
outlook on detailed problems or responsibilities which evolves inthe
course of long-time daily collaboration. Such a committee is likely to be
able to take decisive action only if it happens to include aman who is
deferred to by all the rest and is accustomed to dominate. Strongmight
have played such a role. Harrison could not.
The shift of power from New York to the other Banks mightnot have
been decisive, if there had been suflcientiy vigorous and informedin-
tellectual leadership in the Board to have joined with Harrison inover-
coining the resistance of some of the other Banks. However,no traditjo0
of leadership existed within the Board. It had not playeda key role ir
determining the policy of the System throughout the twenties. Instead,it
had been primarily a supervisoi-v and review body.'75 It had itswas' in
early 1929 about the use of "direct pressure" instead ofquantitative
measures in dealing with speculation, because it had a vetopower over
discount rate changes, not because it was able to win the Banksto its
views.
There was no individual Board member with Strong'sstature in the
financial community or in the Reserve System,or with comparable ex-
perience, personal force, or demonstrated courage. Roy Young,governor
of the Reser'.e Board until September 1, 1930,was apparently an able
administrator, and Strong supported his appointment.However, he
took a leading role in the conflict between the Bank andthe Board and
strongly opposed open market operations ingovernment securities. He left
the Board to become governor of the Reserve Bankof Boston, a position
which enabled him to continue to exert his influenceagainst the policy
favored by New Yorkand perhaps not less effectivelythan before. Young
was succeeded by Eugene Meyer, who had left his Wall Streetbrokerage
firm in 1917 to serve with a war agency, becamehead of the War Finance
Corporation, and then served witha succession of government agencies,
ending with the Fedecal Farm Board, beforecoming to the Reserve Board
in 1930. Meyer was appointed just afterHarrison had failed in his at-
The salary structure in the Systemat that time is sonic indicationofthe eela,ive position of the Banks and the Boardand of their ability to attract able people. Board member, received $12,000a year untd 1935. Though equal to the salary of cabinet members, those salarieswere drastically lower than those of Bank
governors (later presidents). Strong at New Yorkreceived $50,000 a year from 1919 until his death, and Harrison thesame. The salaries of other Bank governors ranged uiorn atow of $20000 (sixsouthern and western Banks)to $35,000 (Chicago) during the twenties. Therelative differentialswere only slightly nar- rowerin1960:Board members, $0.000(thechairman $500 more);the highest paid Bank president,$60,000(New York); thelowest. $35,000(all other Banks except Chicago and SanFrancisco).
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tempt to persuadethe other governors toengape in open marketpur-
chases and just before the onset of the fi,t liquidity crisisoboth
grounds a difficult titise to get the System to change course sharply:
Per-
haps if he hadhad more time to develop his leadershipof the System, he
might have been able to lead the System along a different route.'77 Inthe
initial months at his post, he was in favor of expansionarymeasures and,
through most of 1931, he tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Conference
to approvelarger open market purchases. During his sixmonths as chair-
man of theRFC, FebruaryJuly 1932, mernber of theBoard felt he
slighted his duties as governor. None of the other full-time membeof
the Board or staff had the personal qualities and the standing within the
System to exercise the required leadership.'8
During Meyer's term ofoffice, two committees of the ReserveSystem (in-
cluding officials of several Reserve Banks), appointed to study problems of branch,
chain, and group banking, and of reserves, submitted reports but no action was
taken on their recomsnersdatiorts (see Report of the Federal Reserve Committee on
Branch, Group, and Chain Banking, mimeographed, 1932; and "Member Bank
Reserves_-RePort of she Committee on Bank Reserves of the Federal Reserve
5)35cm,Federal Reserve Board, Aetntial Report for 1932, pp. 260-205'). Meyer
recommended to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency a unified Com-
mercial banking system for the United States to be implemented by limiting bank-
ing privilegns to institutions with national charters. He obtained the opinjot of the
Board's general counsel in support of the constitutionality of such legislation
(ibid., pp. 229-259). but no further steps were taken.
"Haitinon opposed Meyer's acceptance of the chairmanship of the RFC (Noses,
Vol. 11, Jan. 21, 1932).
The remaining members of the Board from 1929 to 1933 consisted of Edmund
Platt (who served as vice-governor until he leftthe Board on Sept. 15, 1930),
Adolph Miller, Charles S. Hamlin, George R. James, Edward Cunningham (until
Nov. 28, 1930), and Wayland W. Magee (after May 5, 1931). Platt had studied
law, had been a newspaper editor, then a member of Congress (where he served
on the Banking and Currency Committee) before he was appointed so the Board
in 1920. Miller and Hamlin were members of the osiginal Board appointed in
1914. Miller, an economist of considerable scholarly ability, had written some good
articles on monetary matters. But he, and Hamlin as well, had already demon-
strated just after World War I an incapacity to exert leadership and to take an
independent course. In Chandler's words, Miller. "undoubtedly the most able of
the appointed members of the Board, was the eternal consultant and critic, never
the imaginative and bold enterpriser"Benjooti'n Strong, p. 257, and alto pp. 44-
45). If any credence can he put in Hansliti's repeated comments ott Miller, this
is a generous evaluation. Hanslin's Diary makes Miller out to be a self-centered
person, with little hesitancy in using his public position for personal advantage.
and capable of shifting position on important issues for trivial reasons (see Vol. 4,
Aug. 6, 1918, pp. 180-181Vol. 6. May 6. 1921, p 90; Vol. 14, Jan. 6. June 9,
1920, pp. 105, 106, 180; Vol. 16, Oct. 30. 1929. p. 194),
Hainlin was a lawyer, detcribed by Chandler as "inielligen'....but ...as
ore of his associates pus is, 'an amanuensis sort of fellow unlikely to undertake any-
thing on his own'" (Benjamin Strong, pp. 256-257). His Diary confirms this
view. He was shrewd, particularly about political issues and details of administra-
tion, public spirited irs a self-righteous wa', dependable and honest, if inclined to
bepartisan,and,fortunatelyfor our purposes, an inveterate and, so far as




The detailed story of every banking Crisis in Our llisoryshows ho
much depends on the presence of one or moreoutstanding individual5
willing to as'irne responsibility and leadership.'It was a of the
financial system that it was susceptible to crises resolvableonly with such
leadership. The existence of such a financial system is,of coursethe ultimate explanation for the financial collapse, rather thanthe shift of
power from New York to the other Federal Reserve Banks andthe weaj.
ness of the Reserve Board, since it permitted those circumstances
to have
such far-reaching consequences. Nonetheless, given thefinancial systej-r
that existed, the shift of power and the weakness of theBoard greatlyre-
duced the likelihood that the immediate decisive actionwould be taken,
which was required to nip the liquidity crisis in thebud.
In the absence of vigorous intellectual leadershipby the Boardor of
a consensus on the correct policy in the communityat large or of Reserve
Bank governors willing and able toassume responsibilit' for an irid.
pendent course, the tendencies of drift andindecision had fullScope.
Moreover, as time went on, their forcecumulated. Each failureto act
made another such failure more likely. Menare far readier to pleadto
themselves as to otherslack ofpower than lack of judementas an ex-
planation for failure. We have alreadyseen this tendency expressed inthe
standing of the broader issues ofmonetary policy and no sign ofventuresomenru inthought or action. James wasa small merchant and manufacturerfrom Tennessee and,for a few years, had been presidentof a commercial bank: Cunninghama farmer; Magee, also a farmer and rancher,who had been a memberoftheboardofthe Omaha branchoftheReservel3ankof Kansas City and then a director of theBank of Kansas City (seeChandI0'5 corn- mente, Benjamin Strong,pp. 256-257).
Of the staff, E. A. Goldenweiser,director of research and statisticsfrom 1926 to 1945, was perhaps the most influential,but he was primarilya technician His predecessor, Walter W. Stewart,had been close to Strong, hadinfluenced him greatls-, and continued their relationshipafter leaving the Board in 1926.Golden. weiser was a gentle person whocould not match Stewart'tinfluence on policy. The cx officio members ofthe Reserve Boardwere the Comptrollerofthe Currency, and the Secretary of theTreasury, who servedas chairman_from 1921 so February 1932, Andrew W. Mellon,a well-known financier and industrialistat the time of his appoinment;thereafter, until March 1933,Ogden L Mills. Mills. alawyer,taxexpert,and Congressmanbefore becoming UnderSecretary of the Treasury in 1927,was an able and forceful man. Asmentioned above, he gave active support to theGlass.Steagall bill because hesaw lack of fret gold limiting Federal Reserveaction. Mills apparentlycontributed the chief ideas cosbodird irs the EmergencyBanking Act of Mar, 9, 1933(see Chapter 8). J. W. Pole, formerly chief U.S.national bank examinerand Comptroller of the Currency from 1928 toSeptember 1932, advocatedas a bank reform measure branch banking limitedto "trade areas" or regionsaround important cities. But he had no influence ofrecord on bank legislationor Federal Reserve policy during that period (see Comptrollerof the Currency, AnnualReport, 1929, p. 5; 1930, p. 5; 1931, p. 1). Hamlin referredto him as "on the whole,a good but not very strong man" (Diary, Vol. 21,Sept. 1, 1932,pp. 105-106),
See Spragsse, History ofCrises, Passirn.
122THE GREAT CONTRA.TON
Federal Reserve System's reaction to tlìecriticism of itsPolicies during l9l92l. It was expressed again iii 193Q-33as the Boardexplained eco- nomic decline and then bankine failisrpc
as OcCuiring despiteitsOWO actions and as the product of forcesover whichithad nocontrol And no doubt the Board persuaded itselfas well as othersthatits reasoning was true. Hence, as eventsproceeded '.iaincreasingjy inclined to look elsewhere for the solution,at first to hopethat matters would right themselves, then increasinglyto accept the that crisis and doom were the inescapable productof forces in theprivate business community that were developing beyondthe System'scontrol. Having failed to act vigorously to stem the firstliquidity crisis in thefall of 1930, the System was even less likely to act thenext time. It was onlygreat pressure from Congressional critics that inducedthe Systemtø reverse itself temporarily in early 1932 byunderta1çiig the large-scalesecurities purchases it should have made muchearlier. When theoperation failed to bring immediate dramatic iniprovenjent, tileSystem promptlyrelapsed into its earlier passivity.
The foregoing explanation of thefinancial collapseas resulting so largely from the shift of power from NewYork to the otherFederal Re- serve Banks and from personal backgrounds and
characteristics of themen nominally in power may seem farfetched.It is a sound generalprinciple that great events have great origins, andhence that somethingmore than the characteristics of the specificpersons or official agenciesthat hap- pened to be in power is requiredto explain such a majorevent as the financial catastrophe in the United Statesfrom 1929 to 1933.
Yet it is also true that smallevents at dines have largeconsequences that there are such thingsas chain reactions arid cumulativeforces. It happens that a liquidity crisisiraa unit fractional reserve banking
system is precisely the kind of event thatcan triggerand often has
triggereda chain reaction. Andeconomic collapse often has thecharac- ter of a cumulative process. Let itgo beyond a certain point, and it will
tend for a time to gain strength from itsown development as its effects
spread and return to intensifythe process of collapse.Because no
great strength would be required to holdback the rock thatstarts a
landslide,it does not follow that the landslidewill not be of major
proportions.
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